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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ANDREW BRINK,

:

Case No. 20060954-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant/Defendant Andrew Brink appeals from a final judgment of conviction
for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(2003), entered by the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve, Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2) (j) (2002). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to allow Brink to
introduce expert testimony specific to the facts of this case in support of his identification
defense where identification was the central issue?
Standard of Review: The trial court's decision to exclude the expert's testimony is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ^|665 44
P.3d794.

Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 56-72, 85-86, 144-288, 289,
393, 395:93-96.
RELEVANT RULE PROVISION
The text of the following rule is relevant to the issue on appeal.
Utah Rule of Evidence 702
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 19, 2006, the State charged Brink with one count of Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. R. 1-9. On
March 29, 2006, Brink gave notice of his intent to call Dr. David Dodd, an expert witness
on eyewitness identification. R. 42. The state filed a motion in limine to exclude the
expert testimony. R. 73-84. Brink filed a memorandum in support of the expert's
testimony. R, 56-72. On May 10, 2006, the trial court held a hearing where Dr. David
Dodd was questioned about the testimony he would offer. R. 393. The hearing was
continued until May 15, where three of the state's witnesses were questioned about the
robbery. R. 394. On June 1, 2006, the trial court granted the state's motion to exclude
the expert's testimony. R. 289.
A jury trial was held June 6 and 7 where Brink was found guilty of aggravated
robbery. R. 305, 325, 395, 396. On June 12, Brink filed a motion for arrest of judgment.
2

R. 366-67. The state opposed the motion for arrest of judgment. R. 368-73. On
September 25, 20065 Brink was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than 6
years to life in the Utah State Prison. R. 377. A timely notice of appeal was filed on
October 16, 2006. R. 379-80.
STATEMENT OF THE FACT
On October 5, 2005, two men armed with guns took money from the Breathe Day
Spa located in Sugarhouse. R. 2, 395. The following testimony about the robbery was
given by witnesses at trial. R. 393, 394, 395, 396.
Alicia Warnock: In the evening of October 5, 2005, Warnock had just finished a
spa treatment at the Breathe Day Spa located in Sugarhouse. R. 395:13-14. Warnock
went to the front of the store near the double glass front doors with Amber, an employee,
to discuss some products with her. R. 395:16-17. It was dark outside but there was some
lighting outside the front door. R. 395:16-17. Warnock noticed two men right outside the
front doors "scoping out the place." R. 395:17. The two men caught Warnock's eye
because they did not appear to be typical of those that attend spas. R. 395:17. The
individuals looked "anxious" as they stood by the front door. R. 395:18. Warnock
testified that one of the individuals was wearing a navy blue sweatshirt with a navy blue
bandana or hat and the other was wearing a white or gray sweatshirt with a white
bandana. R. 395:18, 27-28. Warnock described the man in navy blue as Hispanic with a
"skinny" build and a dark goatee. R. 395:27. The man in white Warnock described as

3

"white, 22 years old, 5' 10, 160" pounds with a "skinny build" wearing a gray hooded
sweatshirt and black pants/jeans. R. 395:28. Wamock thought that they must be
boyfriends of the girls that worked there so she put it out of her mind and began speaking
with Amber again. R. 395:18.
The individuals did not have their faces covered while they stood outside the door.
R. 395:21. Warnock was able to see the face of the individual in the white bandana and
identified him in court as Brink. R. 395:21-23. However, Warnock had previously been
unable to identify Brink from the photo spread shown to her by Detective Shoney. R.
395:106. On the stand, Warnock denied having been shown a photo spread by Detective
Shoney where she was unable to identify Brink as the suspect. R. 395:25, 105-06.
Warnock testified that she was only shown a photo spread with Timothy Dorrell and was
able to point him out as the first suspect. R. 395:25. However, Detective Shoney testified
that he had shown the photo spread with Brink in it to Warnock and she was unable to
identify anyone from it. R. 395:106.
When Warnock looked back at the men, they started to open the door and come
inside. R. 395:18. As the individual in the white bandana came in, he used his arm to
cover his face. R. 395:21. As the men entered through the front doors they held "small,
black handguns" waist high. R. 395:19, 30. The man wearing navy blue told Warnock
and Amber to step aside and took them to the sitting area within the spa. R. 395:20. The
sitting area was off to the side of the counter with the register and consisted of an area
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with a wall of product through which one cannot see. R. 395:20, 30. The other
individual went to the cash register. R. 395:19. The individual in the navy blue stated to
Wamock and Amber that he "was new at this, so just do what I say," R. 395:20. This
individual kept telling the women to look down but Warnock, who works for a bank, kept
looking at the individual "for clues." R. 395:21. Warnock testified that she saw the
individual in white accept the money and the individuals left. R. 295:24. The robbery
took between 15 to 20 seconds according to Warnock. R. 295:24.
Octavia Martucci: On the evening of October 5, 2005, Martucci was working the
front retail desk at Breathe Day Spa. R. 395:62. Martucci first noticed something was
wrong when a man with a white bandanna on his head holding a "silver" gun in one hand
and using his other arm to cover his mouth told her to "give [him] the money." R.
395:63, 77, 82. Martucci described this individual in her police report as "white,"
"skinny," "120" pounds, "between 16 and 25" years of age, and "about 5*8."" R. 395:81.
Martucci noticed that another man had also come in with the individual asking for money
and he was wearing "a blue sweatshirt and a blue cap [or beany]." R. 395:65, 77.
Martucci described the second individual as "white, about the same age, 16 to 25, about
5'6," "scruffy shaved" and about 120 pounds. R. 395:81-82.
After being asked for money, Martucci walked to the end of the counter and took
money out of the register. R. 395:64. The man in the white bandanna stood across from
counter at an angle 3 or 4 feet away from Martucci. R. 395:67. However, in Martucci's
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police report she wrote that she had given the money to the individual wearing the blue
beany. R. 395:80. Martucci testified that she removed between $400 and $450 from the
register and handed it to the man in the white bandanna. R. 395:67. The man took his
arm away from his face and took the money from Martucci. R. 395:68. As Martucci
gave the man the money she made eye contact with the individual. R. 395:69. However,
Martucci testified that her focus was primarily on the individual's gun during this
incident. R. 395:69, 84 Martucci testified she "was very scared" and that this was a very
frightening and traumatic experience. R. 395:69, 84.
The man in the white bandana told everyone to get on the ground so they moved to
the waiting area and got on the ground. R. 395:70. The men then left the spa. R. 395:70.
The individuals continued to lie on the ground for a few seconds then locked the front
doors and called police. R. 395:70. About a week later Detective Bumingham showed
Martucci a lineup of photographs. R. 395:72. The detective told Martucci to put a box
around the individual who looked familiar to her and sign her name by it. R. 395:73.
Martucci testified that the detective told Martucci that the individual from the robbery
may or may not be in the photographs. R. 395:73. However, at the motion hearing she
testified that she couldn't recall the detective giving her that cautionary instruction. R.
395:86. About a minute later, Martucci identified Brink from the photo lineup as the
person who committed the robbery. R. 395:73, 74.
The detective asked Martucci to rate how sure she was that Brink was the
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individual in question: Martucci stated her certainty was about a seven out often. R.
395:74. Martucci testified that she wasn't "so accurate at that time" but became more
certain over time each time she saw Brink, R. 395:74-76. Martucci became more
convinced it was Brink when she saw him at the preliminary hearing sitting at defense
table in his jail clothes. R. 395:87. Then again at the motion hearing and finally at trial,
Martucci testified that she was now "very certain" Brink had committed the robbery. R.
395:76, 88. To explain the discrepancies between her police report and testimony,
Martucci testified that she filled the police report out right after the incident when she was
frightened and frazzled. R. 395:90. However, after she has had time to think about the
incident her mental state is clearer. R. 395:90-91.
Sunni Jackson: Jackson was working the retail counter with Martucci on the
evening of October 5, 2005. R. 396:116, 120. Two individuals entered the spa. R.
396:118. One of the individuals was wearing a gray sweatshirt and a white bandanna on
his head and the other was wearing a dark blue sweatshirt. R. 396:118-19. Jackson
estimated that the individual with the white bandanna weighed 170 pounds, age 17 to 22
and 5'11". R. 396:124, 126. Jackson described the individual in the dark sweatshirt as
tall and skinny weighing about 150-60 pounds. R. 396:124. The individual wearing the
white bandanna approached the counter and said to Jackson twice to "Give me all your
money." R. 396:121, 126. At first, Jackson wasn't paying attention but she heard a
"click" and then saw that the individual was pointing a "gray" gun at her and Martucci.
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R. 396:121, 123-24. The individual held his arm over his face to obscure it. R. 396:121,
126. Jackson was not able to get a good look at this individuals face and was therefore
unable to identify him. R. 396:127. The individual wearing a dark sweatshirt was
standing closer to the cash register. R. 396:121. The individual in the dark sweatshirt
had Amber and Warnock sitting down in the waiting area off to the side. R. 396:122,
126. Jackson then testified that she indicated in her police report that Martucci gave the
money in the register to the individual in the dark sweatshirt. R. 396:123. Jackson
testified that her heart was racing and she was nervous when filling out the police report
after the robbery. R. 396:125.
Detective Burningham: On October 7, 2005, Detective Burningham received
information from a detective in another agency about a possible suspect. R. 395:34.
Detective Burningham had been told that Timothy Dorrell had confessed to the robbery
and had named the second suspect as Andy. R. 395:2, 34, 41. The detective was told that
Andy could be located at an apartment building on 130 South 300 East. R. 395:35. The
detective was told that Andy lived on the bottom floor of that apartment building across
from the laundry room. R. 395:35.
Detective Burningham went immediately to that location to investigate and obtain
an apartment number. R. 395:36. The detective discovered that Brink and his girlfriend
lived at the apartment. R. 395:36. Detective Burningham, with the assistance of another
detective, returned to the apartment and made contact with Brink. R. 395:36-37. After
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making contact and questioning Brink for awhile, the detectives took him back to the
station for further questioning. R. 395:38. Brink was questioned at the station about the
robbery for approximately two hours. R. 395:40. Brink admitted knowing Dorrell and
that he had been with him at some point the night of October 5th. R. 395:41. However,
Brink denied having any involvement with the robbery. R.395:49; 396:129.
Dectective Burningham compiled photographs called a six-pack photo spread to
show the witnesses. R. 395:43. Burningham testified that he picked five photographs
"that are like appearance individuals, same race, same gender, same hair color, eye color,
[and] age range" as Brink. R. 395:43. Burningham along with Detective Shoney went to
Breathe Day Spa to show the photographs to Octavia and Sunni. R. 395:44. Burningham
testified that when showing photographs to witnesses he typically instructs them "that the
suspect that [they] are looking for may or may not be depicted, and they should not feel
obligated to pick anybody." R. 395:45. Burningham testified that when showing the
photographs they separated the witnesses, instructed them that the suspect may or may not
be in the photos and to point someone out if they were fairly certain that they could. R.
395:46. However on cross-examination, Burningham could not recall whether he had
given this cautionary instruction when showing the photographs to Octavia. R. 395:51.
Timothy Dorrell: Dorrell testified that he committed the robbery at Breathe Day
Spa, that his accomplice was not Brink but a man by the name of Jeff Crisp. R. 392,
395:99. At the preliminary hearing, Dorrell described Crisp as white, 5'9", scruffy beard,
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19 years old. R.* 392:32-33. Dorrell was able to identify Crisp as his accomplice from an
enlarged photograph shown to him. R. 395:99. Crisp has a similar build and features as
Brink. R. 58, 392, 396. Dorrell testified that he gave the name "Andy" to police when
questioned about the robbery because they "weren't getting along. [He] had to name
somebody. [He] thought [he] could get off if [he] named somebody. So [he] just said
Andy." R. 395:101, 102. Dorrell testified that he is currently serving a sentence at the
Utah State prison for the robbery he pled guilty to committing. R. 395:101-03.
Andrew Brink: Brink testified that he is a white male, 21 years of age, 5'8" and
weighs 160 pounds. R. 396:129. Brink testified that although he cannot recall October 5,
2005 completely, he was not involved in the robbery of Breathe Day Spa. R. 396:129.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Brink the opportunity to introduce
expert testimony focusing on the specific facts in this case in support of his identification
defense. Because the state's case rested almost entirely on the witnesses' identification,
the jury's consideration of guilt or innocence depended on the weight they gave the
testimony and how accurate they viewed the identification to be. Case law and studies
continue to show that the average juror does not understand the fallibility of eyewitness
identification and jurors' belief about eyewitness identification often is contrary to
research findings. The expert's proffered testimony would not only have educated the
jury on various general issues and pitfalls besetting identification testimony, but would

10

use specific analogies between the specific facts of this case and the circumstances and
settings of studies of which he had knowledge.
Relying on State v. Hubbard, the trial court, without analysis of the specific facts
in this case, determined that Hubbard allowed a jury instruction in lieu of expert
testimony if it concluded that the testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury. 2004
UT App 211, 48 P.3d 953. The trial court determined that the expert's testimony did
constitute a lecture and therefore could use jury instructions to educate the jurors. The
trial court misapplied Hubbard to create a per se rule disallowing the use of the
eyewitness identification testimony without ascertaining whether the specifics of this case
required such testimony. In this case, the expert was prepared to testify about the facts
specific to Brink's case that could have influenced the accuracy of the eyewitnesses'
identification. Expert testimony would have been helpful to the jury since identification
was the central issue, there is little other evidence linking Brink to the crime, and the
expert testimony related to factors which could have affected the accuracy of the
identification. It is likely, given the lack of evidence linking Brink to the robbery, that the
exclusion of the expert's testimony had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
BRINK THE USE OF AN EXPERT WITNESS TO ASSIST THE JURY IN
UNDERSTANDING THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
TESTIMONY.
Eyewitness identification is the central issue in this case. Brink filed a "Notice of
Expert Witness" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003) intending to call Dr.
David Dodd, a psychology professor at the University of Utah who specializes in
eyewitness identification. R. 42. In a memorandum in support of Dr. Dodd's expert
testimony regarding eyewitness identification, Brink argued that Dr. Dodd's testimony
was necessary "to inform the jury not only about the psychological research on eyewitness
identification, b u t . . . how the research applies to the specific factors of Ms. Martucci's
identification of Mr. Brink." R. 60. Attached to the memorandum was a letter from Dr.
Dodd indicating the information from this case that he had reviewed to form his expert
opinion "on the basis of [his] knowledge of the research on eyewitness perception &
memory" and his detailed analysis of the problems with the eyewitness identification in
this case. R. 66; Addendum B.
The state filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony arguing that the
"expert proposes to instruct the jurors on the general scientific principles, and then
proposes to evaluate the testimony of Ms. Martucci in light of those principles. This
would invade the province of the jury to asses credibility." R. 78. Instead, the state
argued that its "proposed jury instructions have been specifically tailored to the issues in
12

this case, and would be the proper manner in which to address any deficiencies in the
identification." R. 78.
A motion hearing was held on May 10, 2006, where Dr. Dodd testified about
eyewitness testimony and the three stages of memory: acquisition, retention and retrieval.
R. 393. Dr. Dodd addressed studies and information regarding the impact on acquisition
caused by disguises, duration of observation, fear or stress and weapon focus. R. 393.
With regard to stress specifically, Dr. Dodd testified "that the public doesn't understand
very well; that, when people are highly stressed, their mental processes are disrupted, and
that includes acquiring information about what's going on around you and who it is that
you're observing." R. 393:10-11.
Dr. Dodd also testified concerning the retention stage and how suggestion "may
alter the memory of the witness." R. 393:13. This is most common with the creation of
photo spreads or line-ups and "what the witness believes about who he or she will see in
the set of available alternatives." R. 393:13. Photo spreads that are put together with
individuals that closely match the suspect as opposed to the description of the perpetrator
"make it very hard for a witness to ever succeed" in picking the correct individual. R.
393:14-15. Also, photo spreads that are done simultaneously, like in this case, as
opposed to sequentially, make a witness "inclined to do a comparative judgment; that is,
to look at the six and say, 'okay, of the six, which one looks like - most like the person I
remember?'" R. 393:17. In regard to retrieval, Dr. Dodd testified that "every retrieval is
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influenced by previous retrievals" so that the memory a witness has of a suspect from
studying a lineup will "merge[] in some way with memory of the events at the time of the
crime, and they will continue to make the same identification." R. 393:20. In addition, a
copy of Dr. Dodd's detailed report of how these factors affect the eyewitness
identification in this case was presented to the trial court. R. 66.
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude Dr. Dodd's expert
testimony. R. 289. The trial court, relying on State v. Hubbard, found that "Dr. Dodd's
testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury." R. 289. However, the trial court did not
support its decision with any reasoning. Instead, the trial court invited counsel to "submit
instructions that they believe are appropriate in light of the evidence presented regarding
eyewitness identification." R. 289. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the
expert testimony regarding the problems with eyewitness identification specific to this
case and determining that a jury instruction could adequately educate the jury on the
problems with eyewitness identification. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be
reversed.
Because the state's case rested almost entirely on the eyewitness testimony, "the
jury's consideration of guilt or innocence .. . depend[ed] on the weight they g[a]ve to this
testimony, including how accurate they view[ed] the testimony to be." State v. Maestas,
2002 UT 123,1J22, 63 P.3d 621 (Durham, CJ. dissenting). However, instead of allowing
jurors to hear expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification and
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the fallibility and misconceptions by the public known to be associated with it, the trial
court "cho[seJ to educate the jury through the use of appropriate instructions instead of
through expert testimony." R. 289. While the jury instruction was "better than no
education at all/ 5 it came after all the evidence was in, and could not adequately
communicate to the jury all the concerns regarding the fallibility of the eyewitness
identification specific to this case as could the expert's testimony when the jury was
hearing the evidence and determining witness credibility. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^23.
Utah R. Evid. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. It states, "[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of
opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. Hence, the test of the admissibility of an
expert's testimony is whether it assists the trier of fact, or in other words, whether it is
helpful. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ^[69, 44 P.3d 794; State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 398 n.8 (Utah 1989).
In order to be "helpful," expert testimony must convey information which is not
ordinarily within the knowledge of the average juror. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,
1361 (Utah 1993).
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must first decide
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average
individual. It is not necessary that the subject matter be so erudite or arcane
that the jurors could not possibly understand it without the aid of expert
15

testimony, nor is it a requirement that the subject be beyond the
comprehension of each and every juror.
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted). In other words, "'expert opinion is proper
when it would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge,
possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror5 . . . ." People v. Brooks,
490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1985) (additional citations omitted).
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court recognized
that correct information regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony is not within the
knowledge of the average juror. Id, The Supreme Court reviewed the research regarding
human memory and eyewitness identification, recognizing "human perception is inexact
and that human memory is both limited and fallible." Id. at 488. Although the research
shows that eyewitness identifications are often unreliable, "juries have a fundamental
misunderstanding of the reliability of eyewitness identifications" and "because jurors do
not appreciate the fallibility of such identifications, they often give eyewitness testimony
undue weight." State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^[26, 984 P.2d 376. The Supreme Court
warned that
research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in
eyewitness identification [;yet,] jurors are, for the most part, unaware of
these problems. People simply do not accurately understand the deleterious
effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory
processes of an honest eyewitness. See K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do
Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?,
6 Law and Human Behavior 15 (1982); J. Brigham, R. Bothwell, The
Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Identification, 7 Law and Human Behavior 19 (1983). Moreover, the
16

common knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to
documented research findings. See Loftus, supra at 171-77.
Long, 721 P.2d at 490.
The increased awareness as to the fallibility of eyewitness identification created by
the studies referenced in Long as well as the concern that jurors' common beliefs about
the reliability of eyewitness identification may actually be contrary to the research
findings led the Supreme Court to reassess its approach of the use of cautionary
eyewitness identification instructions. Id. at 492. Because of the risk that eyewitness
testimony would be given undue weight by uninformed and misguided jurors, the
Supreme Court concluded "that, at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in
evaluating such testimony is warranted" and "abandoned] [the] discretionary approach to
cautionary jury instructions," instead directing that "trial courts shall give such an
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an
instruction is requested by the defense." Id,
The concerns about the fallibility of eyewitness identification expressed in Utah
case law since the Long decision including studies regarding the significant number of
wrongful convictions which have been based on faulty eyewitness identification
testimony necessitate that a trial judge take into account the Supreme Court's teachings
and do a careful analysis of whether a jury instruction can adequately communicate the
information regarding the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence which is
counterintuitive to the average juror. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^|23 (Durham, C.J.
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dissenting) (noting that the use of "new DNA identification techniques [have]
conclusively established that eyewitnesses can be mistaken, for many reasons that are
beyond the general knowledge and experience of the average juror5'); Michael R. Lieppe,
The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y. & L.
909, 923 (1995), (explaining that "[f]or a number of reasons, including data from
empirical studies,... judge's instructions cannot be relied on to counter mistaken
eyewitness identification"); Andrew R. Tillman, Expert testimony on Eyewitness
Identification: The Constitution Says, "Let the Experts Speak," 56 Tenn.L.Rev. 735, 736
(1989); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y. & L. 765 (1995). Where,
in cases like this, eyewitness identification is a central issue and the expert's testimony
will focus on the specific facts of the case in relation to the scientific evidence regarding
the reliability of the eyewitness identification, trial courts should allow the expert to
testify.
Not only is such evidence helpful to a jury, it is essential to a defendant's ability to
present a defense since without such testimony, a jury's misconceptions rather than
relevant evidence could determine the outcome. "Jurors, as well as defendants, are
entitled to the information experts on human memory can provide about its operation."
Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^[19 (Durham, C.J. dissenting). In the present case, expert
testimony would be helpful to the jury since identification is the central issue, there is
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little other evidence linking Brink to the crime, and the expert testimony related to factors
which could have affected the accuracy of the identification.
Instead of allowing expert testimony to educate and focus the jury's attention on
the limitations of eyewitness identification specifically from the facts of this case, the trial
court determined that
[w]hile the Court finds that it would not be an abuse of discretion to admit
Dr. Dodd's testimony, the Court finds State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48
P.3d 953 particularly persuasive on this issue. In Hubbard, the court found
that when an expert's testimony would "constitute a lecture, the substance
of which can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in
a jury instruction, as opposed to through expert testimony," it is entirely
appropriate for the trial judge to choose to instruct the jury instead of
allowing expert testimony. Id. at YJ17-18. I n the present case, the Court
finds that Dr. Dodd's testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury and,
therefore, the Court chooses to educate the jury through the use of
appropriate instructions instead of through expert testimony.
R. 289.
The trial court determined "that Long instructions may not adequately address all
of the problems inherent with eyewitness testimony . . . . " and "following Hubbard's
admonition" "invite[d] counsel to submit instructions that they believe are appropriate in
light of the evidence presented regarding eyewitness identification." R. 289. The trial
court's decision does not explain why or state a basis on how Dr. Dodd's testimony
"would constitute a lecture to the jury" but instead appears to rely on the Hubbard opinion
as creating a per se rule allowing it to keep out expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification regardless of its content and simply give a jury instruction. The trial court
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fails to do any independent analysis of the specific facts of this case in making its
determination regarding how jury instructions are sufficient to adequately educate the jury
on the expert's knowledge which is counterintuitive to the average juror. This is
especially problematic given the very things that studies show effect the accuracy of
witness identification—fear, weapon focus, duration, photo spread line up, and
certainty—were present in this case.
The trial court's use of Hubbard to exclude expert testimony was specifically
addressed by the Supreme Court when it explicitly warned against the adoption of a "per
se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification."
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,114; see also Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^68. Furthermore, the trial
court's reliance on Hubbard is misplaced because Hubbard is a case, unlike this one,
where the expert's testimony did not focus on the specific facts of the case but rather
focused generally on the research and literature surrounding eyewitness identification.
In Hubbard, the defendant sought to have an expert testify "regarding the fallibility
of eyewitness identification testimony." IdL at f9. The trial court held a hearing to
determine whether the testimony was admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). Id The testimony from the expert that the
defendant sought to admit at trial
pertain[ed] to research and theory concerning memory, the reporting of
memory, and the variables known to influence memory and memory
reports. The testimony is designed to provide scientific information that
may assist the trier of fact in interpreting contested adjudicated facts;
20

statements of witnesses as to who and what they saw and happened.
Id
None of the testimony sought to be admitted addressed the problems with the
eyewitness identifications specific to the case but simply outlined the general problems
with eyewitness identification. See id. at | 9 n.l; compare State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT
59, ^(44, 27 P.3d 1133 (no abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where expert
was not familiar with the defendant or fact of the case). The trial court denied the
defendant's motion stating that in this case permitting the expert to testify "was not
'required or advisable'" because "it 'would have a significant tendency to cause the jury
to abdicate its role as fact finder, at least with respect to any issues that must be decided
based on eyewitness testimony." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ^flO. Instead, informing the
"jury regarding the problems with eyewitness identification is 'best accomplished through
[an] instruction.'" Id On appeal, the Supreme Court began its analysis by noting it
"ha[s] not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding
eyewitness identification," but has left the admission of such testimony to the discretion
of the trial court. Id.at^fl4. Citing Butterfield, the Court reasoned that when the
substance of the experts testimony is regarding the "scientific bases and research
underlying the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification" which can be
"adequately conveyed to the jury" through an instruction it is left to the trial court's
discretion to determine whether the testimony would constitute a lecture or not. Id. at
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TJ17. In that case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a cautionary Long
instruction rather than permitting the expert to testify because the instruction could "better
explain[] the substance of the proffered expert testimony, namely the research and
scientific principles underlying the limitations of eyewitness identification." IcL at ^[19.
In this case, the expert had specific knowledge of the facts of this case from
reviewing the preliminary hearing, photo spreads, and police and witness reports. R. 66.
Dr. Dodd's testimony would not only have educated the jury on various general issues
and pitfalls besetting identification testimony, but would use specific analogies between
the facts of this case and the circumstances and settings of specific studies of which he
had knowledge. R. 66-72. As defense counsel argued below, Dr. Dodd's testimony was
the only means by which Brink could fully and adequately present his defense. R. 56-65;
394:43-53; 395:96.
Excluding the expert's testimony in this case was an abuse of discretion because
had Dr. Dodd been allowed to offer evidence to the jury regarding the fallibility of the
eyewitness testimony, it is likely with the scant evidence linking Brink to the robbery, the
jury's verdict would have been different. For example, the state's key witness, Martucci,
testified regarding how her confidence that Brink was the robber increased every time she
saw him throughout the trial process. R. 395. First, when the detective asked Martucci to
rate how sure she was that Brink was the individual in question, Martucci stated she was
about a seven out often. R. 395:74. Martucci testified that she wasn't "so accurate at the
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time" but became more certain over time each time she saw Brink. R. 395:75-76.
Martucci became more convinced it was Brink when she saw him at the preliminary
hearing sitting at defense table in his jail clothes. R. 395:87. Then again at the motion
hearing and finally at trial, Martucci testified that she was now "very certain" Brink had
committed the robbery. R. 395:76, 88. Martucci explained that when she filled out the
police report she was frightened and frazzled, however, after she had time to think about
the incident her mental state was clearer. R. 395:90-91.
While the jury instruction told the jury that it should be aware that "a witness who
has previously made an identification is likely to become more confident in making
subsequent identifications," had Dr. Dodd been allowed to testify he would have offered
the jury evidence regarding faulty original identifications. Studies have shown that faulty
original identifications based on suggestion either unintended or otherwise result in all
subsequent identification being suspect. R. 69-71. Specifically, Dr. I )odd's proffer
indicated that he would discuss studies showing how a witness over time through
repeated exposure to the defendant within the criminal process becomes more confident
that she has chosen correctly and how that identification is not necessarily accurate. R.
69-72; 393:13-21. This evidence was especially relevant since Brink's defense was that
the witnesses had mistaken him for Jeff Crisp who is similar in age, build and has similar
facial features as Brink.
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Dr. Dodd also proffered that he would testify regarding "weapon focus," stress,
fear and the impairment on memory these can cause. This evidence was necessary for the
jury to understand while evaluating the testimony of the witnesses who testified that they
were extremely frightened during the robbery and focused on the gun. Dr. Dodd's
testimony, rather than the jury instruction, would have been far more helpful to a jury in
evaluating whether the witnesses were correct in their identification of Brink and was
necessary to ensure that Brink received a fair trial.
Dr. Dodd's specific proffered examples from studies would have clarified the
evidence showing that under the factors present in this case, the reliability of eyewitness
identification is suspect at best. A jury instruction in this case was inadequate to educate
the jury regarding eyewitness fallibility and the average person's misconceptions about it.
Here, Dr. Dodd was prepared to testify about the facts specific to Brinks case that could
have influenced the accuracy of the eyewitnesses' identification. Because the state's case
rested almost entirely on the eyewitness identification of Brink, it is likely that the
exclusion of Dr. Dodd's testimony had "a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,1J43 (citations omitted).
In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony
which focused on the specifics of this case, determining that the testimony would
constitute a lecture to the jury. The trial court gave no reasoning or basis for its decision
but simply found that Hubbard allowed a jury instruction in lieu of expert testimony if the
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court found the testimony to be a lecture. Rather than ascertaining whether the specifics
of this case required expert testimony as outlined in Hubbard, the trial court misapplied
Hubbard to create a per se rule disallowing the use of the eyewitness identification
testimony. Had Dr. Dodd been allowed to offer evidence to the jury regarding the
fallibility of the eyewitness testimony in this case, it is likely with the little evidence
linking Brink to the robbery, the jury's verdict would have been different.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant, Mr. Brink, respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction
for aggravated robbery.
SUBMITTED thisZfl day of February, 2007.
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DEffiRA M.NELSON
V
JOHN WEST
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 061900386 FS

ANDREW BRINK,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

SHEILA K MCCLEVE
September 25, 2006

PRESENT
Clerk:
nicolel
Prosecutor: COLBY, MICHAEL S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 20, 1984
Video
Tape Number:
9/25/06
Tape Count: 10:52
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/07/2006 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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Case No: 061900386
Date:
Sep 25, 2006

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court recommends credit for time served.

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Concurrent to any other prison sentence defendant may be serving.
Restitution
Amount: $460.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM
This restitution is to be paid joint and severally with the
co-defendants.
Dated this
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Mr. John West, Attorney
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 E. 500 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dear Mr. West:
Re: State of Utah v. Andrew Brink (Case No. 061900386)
What follows is my expert opinion on the Andrew Brink case, formed on the basis
of my knowledge of the research on eyewitness perception & memory. Information on
the particulars of this case is formed entirely by the following relevant materials:
Salt Lake Police Department Report (BB5769 Thursday October 13, 2005), pages
1-12,
Witness Reports from Octavia Martucci, Sunni Jackson, and Alicia Warnock, all
date 10-5-2005.
scripl^Hffie^^
- witnesses^
luir a ^ M r . Nofet:
Photocopy of photos of 6 people shown in a photospread to several witnesses and
signed by Ms. Martucci and Detective Burningham on 10-12-05 (The original
photospread was shown to me by Detective Schoney on May 3rd)
Transcript of preliminary hearing of February 23, 2006 (34 pages) consisting
primarily of the testimony of Ms. Martucci.

To date, I have testified in more than 20 trials in Utah and Colorado on
eyewitness issues; my CV was previously provided to you. My testimony would focus
very specifically on the factors that are relevant to the facts of this case in relation to
eyewitness issues, particularly those relevant to the identification process. The existing
research on eyewitness perception and memory has convincingly established that
accurate identification is a process that involves a number of factors that unfold from the
time of the initial observation to subsequent identifications, including identification and
testimony at trial; some of these factors are relevant to this case and will be discussed.
The research clearly shows that the process of identification often involves factors
that are not well understood by lay people, that is, that take place differently than
common sense indicates. Some of these factors are described in the discussion of
factors that follows. Thus, as described in Loftus & Doyle,2 among the misconceptions
'Deffenbacher & Loftus (1982). Do jurors share a common understanding
concerning eyewitness behavior? Law and human behavior, 6, 15.
2

Loftus, E. F. & Doyle, J. M. (1997 and 2005 Cumulative Update). Eyewitness
testimony: Civil and Criminal .(Third Edition) Charlottesville, Va.: Lexis Law
Publishing
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of lay people is that witnesses remember the details of violent events (or those where
violence is threatened) better than those of nonviolent ones. Indeed, most people
remember less well under violence (or threat). Further, while it is clear, consistent with
common sense, that attention and time to observe are relevant to a witness's opportunity
to acquire information, research shows that what a typical lay person might judge as an
apparently reasonable attention and adequate time to observe are not necessarily
sufficient to form an adequate memory, particularly for a person's face.
Indeed, a very recent survey conducted by independent pollsters at Peter D. Hart
Research Associates was summarized in an article for the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers; the poll shows that those surveyed (1,000 potential D. C.
jurors) misunderstand human memory and eyewitness reliability in a number of ways.
"Jurors overestimate the ability of people to remember strangers' faces..." seeing the
process of seeing and remembering as much like making and replaying a video recording.
Jurors also do not understand: a) the role of stress/violence as mentioned above, b) "the
lack of any meaningful correlation between witness confidence at trial and witness
accuracy," and c) that witnesses do more poorly at recognizing members of another race
than their own race. Finally jurors do not understand how various police procedures
during the identification process can affect witness accuracy (as also discussed in Loftus
& Doyle,3, op cit.).
Eyewitness testimony is dependent upon human perception & memory; it is
therefore potentially unreliable, though it can, of course, be very reliable. There are now
hundreds of research reports and dozens of published books detailing the factors that are
influential in determining the degree of reliability or unreliability. The particular issue of
face identification is well studied. The identification of someone well known to a witness
is extremely fast and accurate, but the identification of someone only seen on one brief
occasion is generally much less reliable.
Memory experts, including eyewitness specialists, typically divide the process of
memory into three broad stages: acquisition, retention, and retrieval.4 Acquisition is
the stage in which the relevant information is encoded through the senses (sight and
hearing). Retention involve the maintenance of the memory over time, a process
influenced by the simple passage of time (forgetting) and by related events that may alter
the original memory. Retrieval is calling up those memories, including the report of
what is remembered and the recognition of whether this is the same person (face) seen
before.
Acquisition.
Acquisition is the most critical and depends heavily upon many conditions,
especially the opportunity to acquire the necessary information (including distance from
the perpetrator and lighting), time duration, attentional processes, emotional state, etc.
Reviewing the specifics of this case leads to several relevant factors:
3 Loftus & Doyle, op cit., 2005 Cumulative Supplement, Sect. 1-6, Footnote 13.1
4

cf. Loftus, E. F. & Doyle, J. M. (1997, 2005), op cit.
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Duration of Time. The total time of observation by Ms. Martucci is brief, but
the actual time to observe the perpetrator's face is very brief, at least as indicated in the
preliminary hearing, involving only the moments when the perpetrator's hand moved
away from his face so that he could take the money.. Considerable research shows that
the actual time available is typically overestimated by witnesses, typically in the range of
two to ten times the amount of time actually demonstrated to have passed.
What is acquired. Witnesses quickly acquire certain elements of the events and
people involved. In this case, all of the witnesses describe two different suspects, each
about the same height (5' 10" or a bit less) and weight (skinny, though Martucci's "120
lbs" cannot be true). The witnesses all distinguish between:
Suspect 1, a man wearing a blue sweatshirt, blue jeans, white tennis shoes, a
scruffy shave or goatee, and (perhaps) a blue bandana. Notably the police report
describes this man as "clean shaven," and
Suspect 2, a man (darker in complexion and/or hair) wearing a gray sweatshirt
and black pants, and (perhaps) a white bandana.
These elements of a description are exactly the elements that are likely to be
acquired in a brief observation where witnesses are attending to the person(s) involved.
The witnesses also agree that one of the perpetrators was directly involved with
Ms. Martucci and the cash register, while the other perpetrator held a customer and clerk
under control in the sitting area at gun point. The witnesses agree that the perpetrator
who took the money covered his mouth during all or most of the time the robbery was in
progress. The police report indicates that his hand moved away from his mouth as they
were leaving the building (p. 8 of SLC Police Dept. report), but Ms. Martucci indicates
that this was when he received the money from her. Unfortunately the witness reports are
sparse in certain respects, including the description of the suspects, other than that of
clothing. This could be an indication that the face was not well encoded.
The witnesses disagree about which of these two was Suspect 1 and which was
Suspect 2. Ms. Martucci, in her handwritten report, has the man who took the money as
Suspect 1. But Ms. Jackson and Ms. Devoge are clear that the man who covered his
mouth (Jackson) and the man who took the money (Devoge) is the one described as
Suspect 2. The police report describes Suspect 1 as the man who covered his mouth and
took the money.
While Ms. Martucci had the most direct contact with the man who took the
money, the others had the most direct contact with the other man, the one who was
holding them with a gun. So there is no particular reason to claim that Ms. Martucci is
more accurate in keeping track of which man was which.
Stress and Weapon Focus. The literature is clear that stress is disruptive of
mental processes that are more complex, including acquiring information about a face. A
recent study confirmed this about memory for identifying people by looking at military
personnel put through mock interrogations. The study (a controlled experiment) shows
that the personnel who are subjected to stress do worse at making identifications, even

though their contact with the people to be identified was extended.5 The witnesses in the
present case were under considerable stress because of the brandished weapons; each
had a brief time to learn anything about the perpetrators and the only one to make an
identification did so based on a very short view of the face and under stress related to the
weapon. The reality of this effect of stress is one approach to explaining the confusion
about which perpetrator was which. Thus the fact that the primary witness in the case is
very clear about the person taking the money as Suspect 1 and the others as it being
Suspect 1 who was holding them at gunpoint supports the argument that brief, threatening
situations produce stress which, in turn, disrupts the formation of accurate memories.
The issue of weapon focus is clearly present in this case, that is, the presenced of
a weapon has been consistently shown to distract witness's attention from observing
other elements of the person and situation. Thus the witness looks at the weapon since it
is threatening, as demonstrated in a number of research studies.
Disguise. The scientific literature on face identification is clear that alterations in
the face, including disguises, significantly disrupt identification. The person who took
the money was described as holding his arm over his face. Simple alterations of the face
can have a very strong impact. Indeed, something as simple as having glasses on during
exposure to a first seen person and off during the identification process can reduce
accuracy greatly.
Finally it should be noted that the acquisition stage is fundamental to any
subsequent memory. Without adequate acquisition, there is no way that subsequent
memory can be considered reliable. Indeed, research shows that weak acquisition is
associated with susceptibility to suggestion and with an increased likelihood of false
confidence in a witness's later retrieval.
Retention
The retention stage involves two primary factors, the passage of time and the
presentation of other information which has the potential to alter the original memory. In
most cases including this one, retention intervals are often followed by a retrieval which
is followed by another retention interval followed by another retrieval, etc.
A recent report from the National Institute of Justice (cited below as footnote 7
and discussed in more detail in the text) is directed primarily at the process by which
witnesses provide information about their retention through looking at pictures or lineups
of potential perpetrators. Most of what follows about the photospread is based on those
recommendations and the research that supports the recommendations.
Alteration through suggestion. The intervention of additional information may
alter the original memory, especially if that memory is weak. There is now a very large

5 Anthony Doran, Brunswick, Maine, Gary Hoyt of Coronado, Calif., and Steven
Southwick, M.D., senior author, Stephan Garrett, Paul Thomas, and Madelon
Baranoski. International Journal of Psychiatry and the Law, Vol. 27/3: pp 265-279
4
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body of research6 showing that suggestion can result in changes in "memory." Of
particular concern in this case is the presentation of the photospread in that it is unclear
how the photospread materials were compiled, namely whether the alternative choices are
fair foils for the process. In addition, it is unclear what the Ms. Martucci expected at the
time she was shown the photos.
It is unclear from the available information what basis was used for creating a fair
photospread. The scientific literature is specific that the fair process for selecting the
entire set is to match "foils" to the physical description provided by the witness to the
greatest extent possible. This literature also indicates that broad aspects of the physical
description are quickly and accurately acquired, that is, some information is more rapidly
and reliably acquired than are the details necessary to remember a face.; these would
include information about approximate age, facial shape, facial hair, hair length and
color.
The police report does not indicate how these photos were selected in terms of
apparent match to the description of either of the perpetrators other than "five like
appearance males" (p. 8 of SL Police Dept report); and there is no mention of the
discrepancy between the reports of the witnesses about which perpetrator held his hand
over his mouth, etc.
As Loftus and Doyle (op cit.) strongly point out, the importance of fairness in
presenting lineups and photoarrays is that the selection initially made and publicly stated
will be strongly held to by a witness, even when the choice is clearly shown to be
incorrect.
Also there is no information about what the witness was told (and what she
expected) at the time the photospread was presented. Research has clearly established
that witnesses are much more likely to select someone if they expect that the photos (or
lineup) will include the perpetrator. Indeed, given a blank lineup (perpetrator absent),
witnesses in research studies select a high percentage of the time. One study found that
the false identification rate was 78% from a blank lineup when the witness believed the
perpetrator would be in the set and was only 33% when told that the perpetrator may or
may not be present. 7
Finally it is important to know at what point her choice of the defendant was
confirmed by the Detective who presented the photospread. Confidence is directly
influenced by feedback that the witness has chosen the defendant, as demonstrated by a
number of controlled experiments by Wells and his collaborators. 8

6

Cf. Loftus & Doyle, op cit., chapters 3 & 4.

7 Malpass & Devine\ (1981), Guided Memory in Eyewitness Identification. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 66, 343-350.
8 References to be inserted.
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It is unclear whether the choice of photospread foils was suggestive and whether
the witness's belief about whether the perpetrator would be in the set is also suggestive.
But these two issues are the basis for strong concern about the fairness of the process.
This issue is discussed further in the recommendations below.
Retrieval
The "final" stage of eyewitness memory is influenced by all of the previous
factors, including several that relate to the nature of the retrieval process and its
consequences. And since no identification was made then, this exposure to a face in the
photospread may influence all subsequent identifications.
Subsequent identifications. If a previous identification has beeft made based on
suggestion, all subsequent identifications are suspect. The identification from, in this
case, a photospread has provided a clear and careful look at the person who is the
defendant, under optimal conditions, including time. This means that the person in the
photospread will be identified, rightly or wrongly, in subsequent identifications.
In-court identification. An in court identification is an event that occurs in
virtually all criminal trials and is surely correctly made in the majority of cases.
However, when the original identification is potentially faulty, the reliability of in court
identification is an issue of concern. In court identification is essentially a showup,
which is considered an improper procedure in the NIJ recommendations. Obviously an in
court identification that has been preceded by an acceptably conducted identification
under appropriate conditions is not as suspect as is an in-court identification preceded by
a problematic previous identification. A showup of any kind is potentially very different
than true identification, requiring very little similarity between the perpetrator and the
defendant, and thus operating largely on the power of suggestion. The suggestion is of
this sort: The only person sitting at the defense table who is not an attorney and who is
similar to the perpetrator must be the perpetrator; that person is now on trial for the
crime, that trial is a consequence of a process based on diligent police work; etc.
Procedural recommendations from NIJ
The analysis of criminal cases in which eyewitnesses are definitively proved
wrong (described below) is a strong factor in many National Institute of Justice9
recommendations (as discussed above) that focus heavily on the kinds of procedures
followed in presenting photospreads and lineups, including providing the witness a fair
set of photos among those presented, and the necessity of giving witnesses a strong
caution that the real perpetrator may, or may not, be present among the choices. This
case seems also to provide the ideal circumstances for the claim that sequential
presentation is preferred over simultaneous presentation. Experts are in general
agreement that the simultaneous presentation of a set of faces in a photospread (or in a
lineup) leads to higher levels of errors as a result of the comparative judgement process.
Seeing all of the faces at one time results in a process of comparing the choices and
9

National Institute of Justice. Eyewitness evidence: A guide for law enforcement.
October 1999
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narrowing them down to the one who looks most like the perpetrator (physical
description or general appearance). The alternative is a sequential presentation in which
the witness views one picture at a time and indicate "Yes" or "No" for each. Such a
procedure also does not necessarily limit the set to 6 pictures since a larger set can be
presented. Here it would be possible, then, to provide pictures that "match" both
perpetrator descriptions among, perhaps, 10 or 12 photographs.
The procedure should also include an immediate indication of witness confidence,
provided before there is any feedback to the witness about whether their choice is
consistent with police conclusions about who is the perpetrator.
Finally, recommendations now being adopted by many states and cities include
the importance of a "double blind" procedure, one in which the person administering
does not know who, in the set presented, is the suspect. Such a recommendation does not
impugn the integrity of police officers, but points to inadvertent cues in the presentation
and subtle reactions of the administrator of the photospread (or lineup). Double blind
procedures are demanded in medical and other scientific research as a check against these
sorts of subtle information to patients, raters, etc.
Witness Errors
In relation to all of the above, it is valuable to note the dangers (and incidence) of
mistakes in eyewitness identification in various circumstances. A paper by several
experts in the field10 provides an analysis of 40 cases in which people previously
convicted of felonies were exonerated based on subsequent DNA evidence. These were
major crimes in which long sentences were common and most defendants had already
served several years. The most common thread to the conviction was that eyewitness
evidence was the sole or primary evidence in 90% of the cases. The incidence of such
errors is a function of police procedures in interviewing witnesses, presenting
photospreads/lineups, and the like.

Sincerely,

Dr. David H. Dodd, Associate Professor
Department of Psychology

Well, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe (1998). Law and human
behavior.
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